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Abstract Theories on international terrorist networks are wrought with contra-
diction. On the one hand, networks that support or facilitate politically motivated
violent extremism are thought to pose a threat because they are centralized and
hierarchical. On the other hand, the same networks are thought to pose a threat
because they are decentralized and operate autonomously. Social networks anal-
ysis (SNA) makes it possible to resolve this apparent contradiction by controlling
across countries for characteristics and structure of networks linked to the same
terrorist organization relative to different functions that such networks perform.
One terrorist organization for which sufficient open-source data exist to mount a
systematic comparison is Al-Shabaab (AS). Comparing traits such as brokers,
centrality characteristics of nodes, international linkages, and use of funds, the
chapter compares AS networks as they relate to recruitment, fundraising and
attacks across the United States and Australia with corroborating evidence from
Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark. Although networks
differ markedly across these attributes, unrelated networks performing similar
functions are consistent in their nature and structure. These findings suggest that
networks are functionally differentiated insofar as they serve as strategic reper-
toires. This is a significant finding. Knowing how a network’s function is related
strategically to its structure means being able to infer a network’s function if only
its structure is known and, conversely, being able to infer a network’s structure if
only its function is known. Not only does SNA thereby facilitate detection and
dismantling of networks, it also suggests that recruitment, fundraising and attack
networks require differentiated approaches by defence and security agencies
insofar as SNA shows them to be distinct phenomena.
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1 Introduction
How do individuals within networks connect, remain connected, bring others into
the fold, connect to other networks, and execute their ultimate objectives while
striving to remain undetected? Answers to these questions are pertinent to contain
and disrupt both the genesis and diffusion of networks that facilitate terrorist ends.
Accordingly, this chapter gauges the extent to which the nature and characteristics
of terror networks are a function of their purpose.
This claim is difficult to investigate. To generate hypotheses about terror net-
works, one needs to be able to control for time and space. Terror networks,
however, are notoriously impervious to examination. Moreover, much of their
activity transpires in hostile environments that are inhospitable to scholarly
fieldwork. Nonetheless, that need not deter us from exploiting available infor-
mation to generate knowledge about terrorist networks. To this end, this chapter
applies Social Network Analysis (SNA) to compare variation across various al-
Shabaab (AS) networks. AS is a particularly opportune subject as it is the one
terrorist organization that operates across different countries while maintaining a
degree of common cause and connection. Although the number of known AS cases
is limited, the quality of the available open-source data is sufficient to allow for
comparative analysis.
Terror networks such as AS are commonly compared to multinational corpo-
rations: hierarchical with centralized command and control structures. Yet, a
growing body of research is skeptical about these assumptions. This chapter
scrutinizes these assumptions empirically in an effort to stimulate a more nuanced
approach to terror organizations and their networks. To this end, it examines
variation in AS activity in the United States, Australia and Canada, and compares
associated networks and their purposes. Recruitment and financing networks turn
out to operate surprisingly independently and different types of activities in the
same locale spawn quite different networks. Although these networks sometimes
overlap in time and space, they are not connected.
Concern among governments and security intelligence services across demo-
cratic countries about ‘‘foreign fighters’’—residents and citizens who go off to
fight in causes abroad—and the consequent risk of homegrown foreign-trained
militants returning from abroad and committing violent acts of terrorism is
widespread and growing [1, 116]. However acute the problem, exceedingly little is
known about local recruitment networks in Western countries. Since open-source
intelligence is hard to come by, empirical SNA research in this area is accordingly
scant. In this light, AS recruiting and fundraising from the Somali diaspora is a
critical case study: the n of cases may be limited and the networks relatively small,
but the available data are comparatively good, robust and comprehensive so as to
allow for methodologically rigorous comparative empirical research.
An estimated 1200 foreigners or ethnic Somalis with a foreign passport are
thought to be fighting with AS, including upwards of 40 American, 100 British and
20 Canadian expatriates since 2007 [2]. When the U.S. House Homeland Security
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Committee released a report detailing AS’ threat to America, Committee Chair-
man Peter T. King declared: ‘‘Right now Al-Shabaab has to be our main concern
because of the fact of such easy travel back and forth, because there is a large
number of (U.S. recruits), and the fact that there is such open recruitment’’ [3].
Concerned that the organization will soon be able to muster an attack on American
soil, U.S. federal prosecutor W. Anders Folk as well as the U.S. Department of
State warned the U.S. government to ‘‘take Al-Shabaab seriously’’ [4, 5].
Expatriates from Maryland to California have reportedly travelled to Somalia to
join AS, but most hail from the ‘Twin Cities’ region of Minnesota, home to
America’s largest Somali diaspora, whose concentration of 25,000 members
represent about one-third of the total Somali diaspora in the United States [6–8].1
The evidence suggests that a group of men concentrated in Minneapolis and St.
Paul formed a network, the activities of which ultimately saw 18 of them leave for
Somalia, and 11 of them die there [9–12]. However, reliable data on these indi-
viduals are sparse. There are three American networks affiliated with AS for which
open-source data are available, the largest of which has 23 verifiable nodes.
Australia also has a sizable Somali diaspora; approximately 11,000 Somali–
Australians live in and around the city of Melbourne, where the network under
investigation was concentrated [13]. This network was responsible for sending two
men to Somalia to train with AS, and was plotting to attack the Holsworthy
Barracks near Sydney at the time of their arrest.
This chapter begins with an overview of current scholarship on how terrorist
networks are structured and how their members interact, as well as an opera-
tionalization of key concepts, such as Morselli’s concept of ‘brokers’ within
networks primary. These concepts are central to formulating the subsequent
hypotheses that were generated by an earlier version of this study that drew on
fewer cases and less complete data. A discussion of the importance and applica-
bility of SNA and small-n research to this topic, as well as the methodology used
to select, analyze and present these cases follows. After the cases have been
presented and analyzed, the hypotheses will be scrutinized using the expanded
data, and avenues for future research discussed.
2 Terror Networks: Overview of the State of Knowledge
Insofar as they link actors who are working towards common goals, networks are
important means to terrorist ends [14, 15]. They make it possible for terrorists to
overcome collective-action problems arising out of complexity and the uneven
distribution of assets that they need to carry out attacks. In the ‘global Salafi jihad’
‘‘the distribution of assets seriously affects its mission against the United States’’
1 Accurate figures for the total US Somali population are hard to come by and range from 35,000
to 150,000.
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[16, p. 145]. Networks are used by terrorist groups to recruit, train and prepare for
an attack to compensate for inadequate resources, identity, culture, emotions, elite
access, ideological support, and recruits [17–21] and to ‘‘provide flexibility,
adaptability, deniability, multidimensionality, and the capacity to do things at a
distance, often through surrogates [22].
This chapter collates two strands of the literature, namely the inter- and intra-
organizational connections between networks. The first investigates how larger,
discrete, yet loosely affiliated networks interact with each other, such as the
connections between al-Qaeda (AQ) and its primary counterpart in South-East
Asia, Jemaah Islamiya [23, 24]. The second investigates how a covert or peripheral
network operating apart from a central network with which it identifies interacts
with this central network and potentially with other networks under the same
umbrella organization. Krebs’ investigation into the network of the 19 individuals
who carried out the 9/11 attacks is an example [25].
Although the very notion of a network contrasts with the notion of top-down
decision-making and arbitration and although ‘‘networks are never managed by a
single (central) authority’’, the notion of hierarchy pervades research on terrorist
networks [17, p. 65]. Different forms of hierarchical control posited in the liter-
ature have different implications for the structure and dynamics of the organization
and its networks: (1) top-down decisions made about to the goals, objectives and/
or function of individual networks (and the dissemination of the information
required to carry these out), (2) ideas pertaining to the general goals of the entire
organization and the reasoning behind these goals (this could be considered the
ideology of the group), and (3) the distribution of funds and resources to networks
to advance either the particular or general goals of the group. This chapter
addresses only assumptions about the first and third forms of hierarchy. It is less
concerned with the more ‘‘macro’’ or ‘‘abstract’’ [26, p. 36] level of terrorism, than
with what cells do to further the ideologically motivated goals of a terrorist entity,
and how these activities are funded.
It is sometimes assumed that a core network directs, at least to an extent, the
operation of peripheral networks. This could include instructions on means and
targeting, when to engage or desist from activities such as recruitment or fund-
raising, quality and quantity of the membership of the network, and members’
characteristics. The 9/11 network was already quite well formed prior to its arrival
in America [25, p. 49], and it appears that the plot’s targets and even the structure
of the network were determined well in advance by AQ authorities outside of the
immediate attack network, namely Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who allegedly
proposed the idea for the attacks to Osama Bin Laden as early as 1996 [27]. While
9/11 was notorious for its complexity and the duration of its planning phase, other
studies of terrorism also presume a substantial degree of external control over the
activities of a particular network. A quote from Ilachinski captures several
assumptions about the operation of illicit networks: ‘‘the manpower mission
requirement is an explicit goal that must be accomplished by the leader of the cell
to which a given target is assigned’’ [28, p. 51]. Ilachinski not only assumes that a
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network has a de facto or de jure leader, and that s/he sets, controls and accom-
plishes ‘‘manpower mission requirements’’ (which in turn assumes that these
networks coalesce in accomplishing a series of discrete tasks), but that the mission
towards which this manpower is directed is assigned exogenously.
Similar assumptions are ubiquitous: ‘‘a Global Terrorist Organization (GTO)
determines the nature and level of terrorist attacks in each country indirectly
through its choice of representatives associated with the local terrorist group’’ [29,
p. 238]. Leistedt also assumes that ‘‘in most cases, there is one person, typically
the founder or cofounder, at the top of the terrorist organisation and structure, and
s/he centralises decisions,’’ and proceeds to speculate about their psychological
state [30, p. 24]. Similarly, Corman’s study of a hypothetical model of AQ depicts
the specialized function of some networks as operating at the behest of a central
organization, to the point where these specializations correspond with individual
top-level council members [26, p. 40], [31, p. 66]. In the same vein, successful
networks are thought to require strong individual leaders who can devise strategies
in response to rapidly changing conditions and impose their will on sub-ordinates
to operationalize their decisions [32, p. 106]. This is reflected in some suggestions
for counter-terrorist policy that understands networks to be organized into hier-
archical hubs where the removal of the central node or leader will cause disarray
and the dissolution of the network. Conversely, the removal of ‘‘grassroots,’’
lower-level actors supposedly leaves the leader stranded and powerless [33, p. 70,
34, pp. 1016–1017].
The sort of specialization Corman ascribes to networks is an aberration in the
literature on terrorism. Instead, networks are assumed to be multitasking: the same
network recruits, fundraises and attacks. The division of labour proceeds by actors,
not networks. According to this conception, individuals hold rigid positions within
a network with responsibilities for specific tasks, and people are recruited into
networks (by a recruitment specialist, of course) to fill particular roles [35, p. 63].
Yang and Sageman [36, p. 301], for instance, assumes that different individuals
play highly specified and agreed-upon tasks within a single network. For example,
‘‘some key members may act as leaders that control the activities of the whole
group while others may serve as gatekeepers to ensure the communication and
coordination between different groups of a larger network’’. This degree of spe-
cialization between individual nodes is premised on central decision-making and
delegation to define and assign roles.
This underlying assumption is that networks are preoccupied with planning and
executing attacks coincident with their location. Tupman, for example, observes:
‘‘Western Europe still remains a recruitment target and perhaps a target for a
spectacular atrocity, as does the USA,’’ due to the presence of terrorist cells
covertly embedded into the fabric of Western society [17, 18]. Another variant of
this line of argument acknowledges the post-9/11 flattening of AQ, which has led
to an increased focus on autonomous, self-funded groups (discussed below in
greater detail). Nonetheless, it assumes that networks, formally disconnected from
an umbrella organization but informally linked through ideological solidarity and
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self-branding, are ultimately focused on perpetrating attacks in Western
democracies.
Even when a decentralized network structure is assumed, the ‘‘parent organi-
zation’’ is thought to infuse ‘‘start-up capital’’ into fledgling peripheral cells [37,
p. 47]. This scenario has a post-9/11 AQ supplying ‘‘money to underwrite conflicts
in many parts of the world,’’ including those involving separate but affiliated
terrorist entities, and perpetually masterminding or executing attacks [37, p. 27].
Shapiro and Siegel’s application of rational choice theory to terrorist funding, for
instance, is predicated on this very assumption even though they themselves think
it is no longer applicable given the structural changes to AQ post-9/11 [38, p. 426].
Hierarchy, however, runs counter to the very characteristics of networks, which
are heralded as ‘‘temporary, dynamic, emergent, adaptive, entrepreneurial and
flexible structures’’, a ‘‘cutting-edge design’’ [26, p. 35] [31, p. 66]. Similarly, the
rigid depiction of networks contrasts starkly with networks as an organizational
structure that consists of ‘‘operatives [who] are highly adaptive, compartmenta-
lised [and] mobile’’ [31, p. 45]. These observations contradict. On the one hand,
terrorist networks pose a threat to Western interests because of their resilient
connections to declared enemies abroad, such as AQ. On the other hand, such
networks are a threat domestically due to their very ability to operate autono-
mously by being able to complete the variegated tasks of planning, funding, and
ultimately executing attacks with little more than ideological support passively
offered by a central organization. That is, the emphasis on offensive networks risks
obscuring how peripheral networks support a central organization in varied ways,
with each manner of support entailing a different relation to the central
organization.
3 Variables: Network Structure and Centrality
This section defines and explains terms that are crucial to structuring and ana-
lyzing these groups, and thus vital in formulating and expressing our hypotheses.
First, network structure matters because it affects the flow of information and
resources.
Networks can take different forms—chain, hub, multi-player, all-channel—but
only two concern this chapter’s findings. A ‘‘hub’’ network features a single node
or very small cluster of nodes at the center of three or more other nodes which
have few—if any—links. Nodes on the hub’s periphery are likely only connected
to each other through the center of the hub, which, as a consequence, has a
disproportionately large influence on the flow of information and resources
through the network. By contrast, an ‘‘all-channel’’ network exhibits a much more
horizontal formation which decentralizes the flow of information and resources.
Only a few if any individuals in an all-channel network are seen as substantially
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more influential and well-connected than the rest, and nodes are generally con-
nected to three or more other nodes in the network.2
Three inter-related concepts are useful in describing and analyzing how nodes
influence the movement of information and resources within and between net-
works: brokerage, degree centrality and betweenness centrality. Brokers are con-
ferred positional advantage in a network insofar as they bridge structural holes—
two unconnected groups of actors—by virtue of having greater access to infor-
mation, opportunities and skills [39–41]. Morselli’s study of members of the Hell’s
Angel’s motorcycle gang in Quebec found that elite members of the group were
directly connected to only a few other members of the network (i.e. low degree
centrality) while at the same time many ‘‘efficient paths pass[ed] through [the]
given node’’ (i.e. high betweenness centrality) [42, p. 187] [43, pp. 385–386].
These are precisely the traits of a broker: a node with few but influential con-
nections. Ergo, an ‘ideal broker’ is an autonomous link between a single node in
each of two networks where such a link constitutes the only connection between
them [43, p. 386].
Brokers are advantageous because they can manage the flow of information and
resources between two groups to their benefit and that of the networks they link
[44, 72–73]. Especially in illicit situations, members in each network can minimize
detection by minimizing connections to illicit individuals [43, p. 384], while
maximizing opportunities to further their objectives through potential access to the
resources of the other group via the broker [41, p. 347, 353]. In turn, the auton-
omous ideal broker—the most knowledgeable about both of the networks of all
nodes involved—can act opportunistically, in this case by connecting transnational
legal and illicit markets. As a result, brokers tend to maximize monetary returns
from illicit activity [43, p. 385].
However, such an actor is described as ‘ideal’ for good reason; more often, one
will observe ‘‘one or two participants who are high in both degree and betweenness
centrality,’’ especially in smaller networks [43, p. 388]. While AS data does not
allow for the quantitative precision of Morselli’s study, Morselli’s 2 9 2 matrix of
the two varieties of centrality outlines four types of actors and their relation to the
nodes of these networks offers a useful typology [43, p. 388] (Table 1):
This matrix is useful because the evidence presented below shows that nodes
within recruitment and fundraising networks differ substantially in degree and
betweenness centrality. They also differ in the special functions that some nodes
serve and that are crucial to the overall function and dynamics of those networks.
Differences in network structure and the centrality characteristics of nodes aside,
their international linkages and the way they use funds are also distinct.
2 Like hub networks, defining all-channel networks as generally having one or two connections
per node avoids conflation with ‘‘chain’’ networks.
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4 Hypotheses
4.1 Functional Differentiation
The illicit networks studied here reveal patterns that challenge assumptions of
current scholarship and lend themselves to generating hypotheses about the rela-
tionship between the ways in which terrorist networks in the West are structured
and how they function. Corman applies the concept of Activity Focus Networks
(AFNs) to terrorist networks, whereby networks are organized around ‘activity
foci,’ defined as categories of activities to which resources and manpower are
assigned strategically to achieve the organization’s goals [26, p. 38]. He (correctly)
acknowledges that networks operating outside of the central network can have
specialized functions [26, p. 39], but falls short of inferring that such specialization
can have consequences for the very structure of these networks. An initial goal of
this study was to identify how existing literature predicts funding and recruiting-
oriented networks to be structured, and subsequently to compare these expecta-
tions against the empirical evidence presented here. However, the apparent
absence of such prediction in the literature suggests that the very notion of a
relationship between network structure on the one hand and network function on
the other hand is underexplored (if not unexplored) in the scholarship of terrorist
networks.
The most striking observation to be gleaned from these findings is the corre-
lation between network structure and its functional objectives. The two recruiting
networks described below follow an all-channel structure. Removal of nodes from
this network as individuals left for Somalia (and upon the subsequent death of
some of the actors there), even in significant numbers over a short period of time,
neither dismantled these networks nor compromised their function of recruiting
men and funding their travel to Somalia until the last wave of recruits departed in
October 2009.
No individual or small group of individuals remained behind to act as a
‘conveyor belt,’ helping groups of men to radicalize and leave for Somalia under
their supervision. While the departure of nodes did not impair the ability of
remaining recruits to network and eventually leave for Somalia, the lack of new
recruits and apprehension of some nodes by law enforcement dismantled the
network. This indicates that there were no nodes, detected or not, that were pri-
marily and/or specifically tasked with recruitment; recruiters that were above the
Table 1 Centrality matrix
High in degree centrality and low in
betweenness centrality
High in both betweenness and degree
centralities
Low in both centralities High in betweenness centrality but low in
degree centrality
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fray of traveling to Somalia to join the insurgency do not appear to exist within
these networks.
Contrary to much of the literature on terrorism, the network’s function was
highly specialized, while individual functions were undifferentiated. Two
hypotheses follow from these observations:
H1 Terrorist networks are functionally differentiated
H2 The structure and characteristics of terrorist networks is a function of their
purpose
4.2 Modes of control
Stohl and Stohl assert that terrorist groups such as AQ ‘‘[do] not maintain control
over who is or is not admitted into the organization’’ [15, pp. 105, 115].3 In effect,
control over who was allowed into the network appears to have been informal and
decentralized. Not only did no one person or group within the network regulate
who was to be recruited and groomed for travel to Somalia, the central organi-
zation set no goals or quotas as to the quantity and quality of Somalia-bound
individuals. Just as no one was controlling who was a part of the network, no
particular person seemed to have domain over any specific task.
The recruiting network was also geographically concentrated. All actors lived
in or around the Twin Cities area, mostly in Minneapolis, St. Paul and in adjacent
suburbs such as New Brighton [45]. This dense distribution of the nodes of the
network enabled in-person meetings between a variety of nodes in an assortment
of venues including mosques, restaurants, private residences and a university
campus. Court documents do not indicate any interactions over telephone or the
Internet between actors in Minneapolis and note only one conversation between an
actor in Minneapolis and another in Somalia [10]. This is especially noteworthy
given the scholarly interest in the role of the Internet in radicalization and
recruitment [46, p. 18, 47, p. 222, 48, 49, pp. 205–208, 50, p. 41]. While it is
entirely possible that members of the network were exposed to radical videos
circulating on the Internet, including those of Al-Awlaki, it seems that these face-
to-face meetings were crucial to establishing trustworthiness, essential in con-
vincing these individuals to travel overseas, and devising the plans and procuring
the funds for them to do so [32, p. 41]. This is not to say that the role of the Internet
is unimportant; Internet propaganda positions AS and its adherents as ideological
authorities who ought to be esteemed by aspiring members of this network [51].
3 Furthermore, this point does not countenance the hierarchical assumptions raised in the
introduction, perhaps most succinctly put in Matthew and Shambaugh’s dictum that ‘‘Networks
are easy to create, but hard to control’’ (2005, pp. 621–622).
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However, this ideological hierarchy did not entail top-down controls over the
specialized function of the network, namely the recruitment of combatants for AS.
The two fundraising networks both exhibit a similar structure, and one that is
distinct from the delinquency homophily—the tendency of individuals to associate
with others of the same kind—exhibited by the recruitment network. Not only are
the nodes situated in America strewn across at least two states in both cases, but
each network also contains individuals located in Somalia who may have never
been to America. The connections between these foreign nodes and others in
Somalia are shadowy in both cases, but their individual contact with American
nodes is well-documented and integral to the successful function of the network,
which in both of these cases was to channel money to Somalia.4 Unlike the
recruitment network, some donors were solicited with jihadi rhetoric, and some
funds were donated with full knowledge of their illicit purpose [52, pp. 6–7].
Similar rhetoric may have been used in the recruitment network, but there is no
discernible effort within either of the fundraising groups to encourage or facilitate
travel to Somalia.
Both fundraising networks exhibit a ‘hub’ network pattern: in each case, a
single node (the broker) was primarily responsible for communicating with an AS
leader in Somalia and relaying pertinent information to the rest of the American
nodes, although the identity of this node can change over time, as we will see. In
one case, the group of contacts in Somalia appeared to form a hub-like structure of
their own, while in both cases U.S.-based nodes are arranged in a single hub
pattern or multiple hubs that are linked to each other by brokers. The broker
between the American and Somali nodes need not be the same individual who
brokers between U.S.-based hubs. These ‘hub’ network structures ‘‘introduce an
element of hierarchy’’ to the network [17, p. 12], with those positioned at the
center having access to information and control over the flow of information and
resources that make them de facto leaders of sorts and analytically special within
the network in ways discussed below.
Three more hypotheses follow from these observations:
H3 Recruitment-oriented networks rely on domestic all-channel networks that
are geographically concentrated (that is, for the purpose of recruitment,
proximity matters)
H4 Fund-raising networks rely on transcontinental hub networks (that is,
proximity does not seem an impediment)
H5 Control over access to recruitment networks is informal and decentralized
4 This is, of course, relative. Plane tickets for the Minneapolis recruits reportedly to cost between
$1,500 and $2,000 each; but the Minneapolis and St.Louis/San Diego fundraising group each
channeled approximately $8,500 and $30,000 to AS operatives in Somalia.
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4.3 Presence of brokers
The recruiting networks were comprised of many individuals who are high in both
degree and betweenness centrality, as well as a few peripheral nodes that are low
in both. In this case, no one node or small groups of nodes appear to be brokers,
especially if all or even some of the implied but unspecified linkages described
above obtain. That is, this network is notable for a lack of actors who are able to
control the flow of information and resources to the extent that they can sub-
stantially determine or even influence the activities of the group.
Conversely, the fundraising networks include many individuals with minimal
degree centrality (i.e. one link), which logically results in a betweenness centrality
of zero. However, within each group a pair or pairs of interacting nodes exhibit
high degrees of both betweenness and degree centrality. The link between these
pairs constitute the crux of the fundraising operations; without these links, the
funds would have to find an alternate sender or receiver: they comprise the main
conduit of information and resources for this network.5 Information (e.g. account
numbers) travelled exclusively in one direction (from Somalia to America), while
funds travelled exclusively in the other.
The hypotheses that follow are:
H6 Fundraising networks rely heavily on the actions of ‘brokers’;
H7 Recruitment networks do not rely on brokers.
4.4 Financial dimensions
Most scholarship on hawala centres focuses on how government policy and media
attention towards Islamic remittance practices is misplaced and/or futile to stop the
minority of hawala transactions that are criminal in nature (see [53, 54,
pp. 514–515, 55, pp. 166–167]. The specialized structure of some fundraising
networks in the U.S. as elucidated here can give rise to equally specialized
strategies for network identification and dismantlement, hence drawing attention
away from the vast hawala system and towards targeting individual networks. As
Tupman notes, ‘‘it is difficult to typologise by financing, as groups resort to a
variety of financing activities over time,’’ [56, p. 198]. This potentially holds for
AS, as they may utilize other means of accruing funds within Somalia.
Technically, the Minneapolis ‘recruitment’ network explicitly engaged in
fundraising as well as radicalization/recruitment, but the pattern of fundraising and
the use of these funds differ qualitatively from the two fundraising networks.
5 Given, as is the case, that the receiving node controls the information (i.e. the account numbers
that correspond to his sub-ordinates) that allows the sending broker to successfully transfer funds
to these nodes.
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Within the recruitment network, all known fundraising activity was in the form of
door-to-door solicitation under false pretense, including sending one of the sub-
jects to Saudi Arabia to study the Koran and supporting orphanages of Somalia.
Almost all of these funds were spent in the Minneapolis area to purchase airline
tickets for the men travelling to Somalia. Even in the two cases where this rule
does not hold, funds were intended for exclusive use by members of the recruit-
ment network while in Somalia.
Fundraising activities coordinated and carried out by this group were necessary to
the recruitment function, and in this case the effective use of such recruits required
an expensive travel itinerary. What few other funds were raised or distributed by this
group were used towards arming specific recruits after their arrival in Somalia. This
funding and spending model is not mentioned in the literature: an autonomously
funded group disinterested in domestic attacks, sending manpower rather than
money to support the central organization. The opposite is true of the other two
networks. Funds raised were not consumed by the Western portion of the network;
instead, they were transferred directly overseas to members of AS’ administrative
network in Somalia for general disbursement. When funds were destined for specific
purchases, their quantity and use were determined by the central group. Overall, the
recruitment network did not raise funds for use beyond the network, while the
American nodes of the fundraising networks did the exact opposite. The fundraising
networks represent a nuanced form of hierarchy between the centre and the
periphery, where the ideological authority of the centre compelled actors in the West
to mobilize on behalf of the centre, which in turn relied in part on funds raised by the
periphery to achieve objectives in Somalia. This interdependence hinges on ideo-
logical authority, or in Bakker et al.’s terms, external legitimacy, which a grievance-
driven group, such as AS, needs to maintain to convince people to risk legal pros-
ecution by offering financial support [57, p. 54].
There is no evidence that any of these networks, irrespective of their structure
or function, received funds or material resources from AS affiliates outside of the
network, nor did they expect such assistance.6 This financial isolation did not
result in a turn to criminal activity to procure funds [7, 58].7 This is especially
interesting in the case of the recruitment network, which contained several indi-
viduals with prior criminal records, including at least one individual indicted on
charges of theft [59, 60]. The use of hawala services for remitting funds to Somalia
and the manner in which these funds were obtained represents an aberration that is
under-represented in the literature. This is especially pertinent to the case of AS
6 While it may have been more expeditious for the individuals in the recruitment network to
receive money from AS for airfare, no actors in this network seem to have stayed behind for lack
of funds. For example, Abdiweli Isse planned to depart in December 2007, but was held back
because his identification needed to travel internationally was not up-to-date. He departed
successfully in October 2009.
7 Door-to-door solicitation (under false pretense or not) for an organization recognized as a
foreign terrorist entity is a criminal activity; but door-to-door solicitation separate from the
terrorist element is not, unlike activities such as theft or trafficking narcotics.
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and Somalia because the failed state does not support Western banking/wiring
services such as Western Union; so, this group cannot effectively make use of the
Western banking system, as terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida have in the past [54,
p. 517, 61, p. 289]. A final hypothesis follows:
H8 Transfer of funds from the central network to peripheral networks is not
necessarily indicative of the pursuit of terrorist ends
Table 2 summarizes key differences and similarities between recruitment and
fundraising networks observed in this section:
5 Method/Social Network Analysis
The nature of the evidence perforce imposes limits on Social Network Analysis
(SNA) that has implications for its application to terrorist networks: the number of
data points is insufficient to employ conventional network metrics. As a result, the
application of SNA in this chapter relies more on concepts and visualisation than
on quantitative measures. However unconventional, the results warrant the
application of SNA. This represents the ideal opportunity for a small-n study;
cases are few, information is scant but has had its validity tested by courts in
multiple jurisdictions, and a study can be carried out with the available informa-
tion, rather than waiting for more detailed information that might never materialize
[62, p. 348].
Owing to their smaller scope, small-n studies can be undertaken in a timely
manner using government documents [62, p. 347]. While the generation of these
documents usually requires those involved to be convicted, this approach can be
operationalized without interviews and other information gleaned directly from
terror suspects, a daunting task whether they are imprisoned or not. The government
Table 2 Summary of fundraising and recruitment characteristics by network
Network Type Fundraising Recruitment
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documents to which this study has access focus on recorded interactions between
suspects as evidence showing act and/or intent. This kind of information is essential
to SNA, which is primarily concerned with determining, mapping and analyzing the
structures created by patterns of interaction between individuals [63, p. 2].
Many insights about terrorist networks, including their genesis, purpose, and the
way they work, stem from interviews with incarcerated and former terrorists or
their associates [64-72]. Yet, such subjective evidence needs to be corroborated.8
Furthermore, victimization surveys and crime-reporting data were never designed
to capture terrorism-related offences; offender reports are difficult to access, and
data held by intelligence services are hard to come by [74]. In light of these
methodological challenges, this study relies instead on readily replicable data.
The illicit nature of these networks as well as the necessarily covert nature of
investigative methods to detect and dismember them encourages secrecy by net-
work members and government officials alike. Identification of the temporal and
geospatial patterns of the stochastic networks in this study relied exclusively on
open sources, including newspapers, academic research, court records, think tanks,
governments and NGOs, and the Internet (caveat emptor). The nature of these
sources imposes certain limitations. For example, the network diagrams below
represent only links between nodes that are confirmed by these sources. Additional
links between an individual and other nodes of a network are known to exist, but
court documents are too vague to draw these links reliably.9
5.1 Case and Node Selection
This analysis expands an earlier pilot study that investigated the structures and
functions of three AS networks operating inside the U.S. between 2007 and 2010
8 First, interviewees are subject to sampling bias and, consequently, information gleaned from
interviews subject to omitted variables and less-robust results, since convicted terrorists are
difficult to access and most refuse to be interviewed [73]. Second, we cannot just take the claims
of interview subjects at face value without corroborating evidence. Third, ex post facto interviews
are prone to the psychological phenomenon of hindsight bias: an interviewee’s memory is
susceptible to distortion when asked to recollect and reconstruct content. They may also intend to
deceive. Fourth, interviews may suffer from the Hawthorne effect: people change their answers
by virtue of the fact that they know that they are being studied. Fifth, interview results are subject
to coding bias. Sixth, information gained through interviews is subject to a priming effect that is
inherent in the way questions are posed and the order in which they are posed.
9 The networks mapped herein include individuals who have interacted and/or coordinated with
each other for purposes related to AS. They exclude friends and family members who may have
interacted with these individuals during their recruitment yet remained oblivious to their
involvement with AS until after their departure and/or death. As a result, not all known
connections between radicalized individuals and members of the Somali diaspora are mapped and
analyzed; we required a strong indication that advancing of AS-related objectives was part of the
relationship between two individuals.
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[75].10. Not only has more information since come to light on these three networks,
but sufficient information has surfaced on an AS network operating in Australia to
warrant expanding the scope. International comparison now makes it possible to
control for factors endogenous to the United States. Addition of the Australian
case also increases the reliability of the findings by virtue of a comparison case for
the Minneapolis-based recruiting network.
These are not the only known AS networks, but information about the others is
too vague to map the network and perform SNA, especially with a reasonable
degree of certainty. For other cases, the absence of court documents significantly
hinders the confirmation of biographical detail and interactions between network
nodes on which SNA is premised [116].
Toronto, for example, home to a majority of Canada’s Somalia diaspora esti-
mated at 150,000, has been linked to an apparent AS network [79]. At least five
men left for Somalia to fight with AS where at least two of them died. All
originated in the Rexdale/Dixon Park area, worshipped at the same mosque and
departed Canada for Somalia within only a few days of each other in October 2009
[80]. However, only one arrest has been made in the case, and the trial is under a
publication ban.11 Our discussion of this group is thus based primarily on media
reports and will consequently not be accompanied by a network map and play only
a supplementary role.
Similarly, AS networks have been reported in the U.K. and the Netherlands.
British authorities reportedly dismantled a network that smuggled Khat from the
U.K. to the U.S. and Canada, where it is a controlled substance used almost
exclusively by Somali males [82, 83]. This is of relevance to this study because it
appears to be a fundraising network that, at first glance, deviates from the fund-
raising networks based in the United States. Besides brief mentions of a Nether-
lands-based AS network in the media, a group of Somali men that included the
father of AS’ then leader Farhan Mohamed Kahiye were arrested in late 2010, but
ultimately turned out to centre on a local case of extortion with only loose links to
AS, if any [84, 85, 117].
10 By definition, a network contains [2 nodes. For this reason, ‘‘lone wolves’’ as well as those
who worked in pairs are excluded from this study. This is worth noting because as a consequence
several prominent AS operatives will be excluded from this study. This includes about a dozen
American cases, most notably Omar Hammami, who grew up in Atlanta with Syrian and
American parents to become AS’ top English-language propagandist before he and AS became
disillusioned with each other in early 2013. This also excludes Danish cartoonist Kurt
Westergaard’s attacker, who acted alone in his attempt to murder Westergaard for his depiction of
the prophet Mohammed, as well as two Danish-Somali brothers arrested in 2012 [76–78]
11 The sole arrested in connection to this group, Mohammed Hersi, has been set to stand trial
since December 2011, but a publication ban is in place, and no new information has come to light
[81].
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6 Evidence
6.1 Minneapolis Recruitment Network
This network consists of 23 individuals, all of whom were American citizens or
legal permanent residents of Somali descent, save one American-born Caucasian
[86]. The purposes of this network were to (1) radicalize, (2) encourage its
members to travel to Somalia to wage jihad with AS, and (3) raise funds to defray
the costs of travel. All 23 men left for Somalia during two waves about a year
apart, with others leaving in-between and later. The first of these waves occurred in
early December 2007, when six men aged 22 to 26 boarded planes en route to
Somalia in the space of eight days [87, 88] [89, pp. 4–5]. For three months prior,
they had met in mosques, restaurants, and private residences to discuss their plans
and to co-ordinate fundraising activities to pay for airfare. All meetings involved
Mahamud Said Omar (MSO) and Omer Abdi Mohamed (OAM) who encouraged
the others to travel to Somalia; MSO also helped raise funds for airline tickets and
at least partially funded the tickets for these men [89] (Government’s Total
Briefing, 2012; pp. 12–16). Of the six, two pairs of men shared the same travel
itinerary to Somalia [89, pp. 4–6]. Others left sporadically over the following
months—MSO himself in January 2008, Zakaria Maruf (ZM) in February 2008,
and Mustafa Ali Salat (MAS) and Mohammed Abdullahi Hassan (MAH) in
August 2008, on the same flight [89, pp. 4–6, 90].
The second wave occurred in 2008 when six men aged 17 to 26 vanished from
Minneapolis, including at least three in the period of 1–4 November [91–93]. At
least four of these men had met regularly in the Carlson building on the University
of Minnesota campus in Minneapolis where two of them worked as security guards
[91]. The last known departures before federal authorities closed in on the con-
spiracy occurred in October 2009 when five men left Minneapolis destined for the
U.S.-Mexico border at San Ysidro, which three of them ended up crossing en route
to Somalia [9, 94, 95, p. 6]. Two other young men have reportedly left Minne-
apolis since for AS-related reasons, although no connections to this or any other
network can be established [87]. MSO and OAM played an important role in the
initial wave of departures without departing themselves at that time; in most of
these later departures they had less of a role, despite the high interconnectedness of
all those who left. More broadly, while OAM, MSO, ZM and CAF helped to
radicalize recruits and co-ordinate fundraising roles, they all travelled to Somalia
at some point (CAF and ZM died there). This suggests that no node of the network
consistently acted as a ‘conveyor belt’ to recruit individuals and possibly assist in
funding their voyage to Somalia.
At first glance, this pattern of departures resembles a series of unrelated con-
spiracies. SNA, however, reveals a high degree of interconnectivity pointing to an
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all-channel network12 among the co-conspirators: as Fig. 1 shows, of 23 indi-
viduals implicated13 in the plot, only three do not have a confirmed or highly
suspected link to another member of the plot.
Additional links, which could not be mapped due to less reliable information
that proved more difficult to replicate, corroborate the all-channel nature of this
network:
Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax (CAF) travelled to Somalia in early 2007, appar-
ently under his own volition, and court documents claim that between September
and December 2007 he told some involved in sending the six men to Somalia in
December 2007 that he experienced ‘‘true brotherhood’’ there [9, p. 9]. Court
documents do not stipulate with which of these eight men he met, but the evidence
suggests that CAF is probably connected to more of these nodes than is apparent
from Fig. 1.14
Although the eight men involved in the December 2007 departures are con-
firmed to have met multiple times, it is unclear whether all men were at all
meetings; therefore, links in Fig. 1 among the six men who left reflect only
confirmed interactions and common travel itineraries. Yet, these six men were
probably more interconnected than is apparent, lest part of Fig. 1 be (mis)inter-
preted to depict a ‘hub’ network pattern surrounding MSO and OAM.
Court records indicate that MSO had contact with at least some of the men who
left in November 2008, although the vagueness of these documents makes it
difficult to establish definitive links between nodes [89]. Court documents also
indicate that he travelled to Somalia between January and April 2008, supplying
funds to unspecified members of the network so that they could procure firearms
[96].
Three nodes lack any verifiable link to any other node in the network. However,
the degree of confidence that these nodes were indeed part of this network is high
because:
Court records for Adarus Abdulle Ali (AAA2) have him meeting with a group
of men to discuss plans to travel to Somalia for the purposes of assisting AS and
accompanying one of these men to the airport [97, p. 1]. However, the court report
does not indicate the group of men with which he attended that meeting or which
individual he accompanied.
Links between Adbikadir Ali Abdi (AAA) and the other members of the plot
cannot be confirmed, although the fact that he was indicted in the same document
12 All-channel networks tend to be horizontal with a high interconnectivity of nodes. If any
nodes appear to be especially central and interconnected, they are few and only marginally more
influential than the rest.
13 ‘Implicated’ means that the individual was either indicted by an American court on terrorist
charges related to these activities, and/or the individual has personally admitted involvement or is
widely acknowledged by AS, but was killed before she could be indicted. Burhan Hassan, who
departed in November 2008, exemplifies the latter.
14 This refers to the six men that departed in December 2007, as well as Mahamud Said Omar
and Omer Abdi Mohamud.
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as ten of the other individuals here as well as his departure during November 2008
intimate links to at least some of the nodes of the network [12].
AHM is confirmed to have raised funds for several of the men who departed
between August and November 2008. On three separate occasions between April
2009 and April 2010, once they had travelled to Somalia, he also provided two of
the men with money at their behest [98, pp. 2–3]. However, court documents do
not indicate to whom AHM was linked.
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Stohl and Stohl hypothesize that ties of friendship and acquaintance can form
the bedrock of a resilient network, and are often strong ties that appear to be weak
when scrutinized [31, pp. 101–102, 25, p. 49]. There are a few confirmed links
between individual nodes that pre-dated any known radicalization or illicit
activity, but such antecedent ties probably existed, especially considering the
geographic concentration of the nodes as well as the substantial number of subjects
who attended the same educational institutions as well as the Abubakar As-Sad-
dique mosque in Minneapolis. One confirmed example are Shirwa Ahmed and
Jamal Bana. The latter has no other verifiable links to the network, despite his
departure concurrent with five others in November 2008.
Within the recruitment network, all known fundraising activity was in the form
of door-to-door solicitation under false pretense, including sending one of the
subjects to Saudi Arabia to study the Koran and supporting orphanages of Somalia.
Almost all of these funds were spent in the Minneapolis area to purchase airline
tickets for the men travelling to Somalia. Even in the two cases where this rule
does not hold, the funds were intended for use by individual members of the
network while in Somalia. This includes MSO’s trip to Somalia between January
and April 2008, where he supplied money to help unspecified members of the
MRN to purchase weapons, and AHM’s transfer of small sums of money (three
transactions totaling $200) to help unspecified members of this network to pur-
chase firearms.
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In addition to raising money for themselves and others within the MRN to
travel to Somalia, one node within the network funded several nodes’ trips to
Somalia without the intention of leaving for Somalia herself. Nima Yusuf (NY)
funded individual combatants from the MRN while they were in Somalia, but
unlike MSO, this node is a woman who never intended to travel to Somalia. She is
confirmed to have sent money to four nodes within the MRN (AA, AI2, CAF, and
MAH) [99, pp. 2–4]. These connections reinforce the all-channel structure of the
network; NY did not fund just a single sub-group of the larger network (e.g. the
group of AI2, AMA, CAF, and FMB that met together repeatedly at the University
of Minnesota), but two individuals within this group as well as two others with no
documented contact with A12, CAF or each other. While this funding is distinct
from the larger sums directed towards the general cause that fundraising networks
generate, this seems to be relatively common behaviour in recruiting networks,
undertaken by MSO, NY, as well as SEA in the Australia Recruiting Network.
In sum, the MRN appears to be the largest publicly known AS network in the
West. Although almost two years separate the first known departure from the last,
a majority of nodes are highly interconnected and exhibit no discernible hub or
chain patterns. In terms of their activities and objectives (1) there is no indication
that they were in any way plotting an attack on American soil, (2) funds raised by
the network were solely to facilitate members’ travel to Somalia and (3) many
nodes raised at least a portion of their own travel funds [12, 100, pp. 12–16].
6.2 Australia Recruiting Network
At first glance this group of individuals, who were indicted on charges of con-
spiring to attack the Holsworthy Barracks near Sydney, Australia in 2009, appears
to run counter to trends established by the MRN. In stark contrast to the MRN,
members of this network attempted to hatch a domestic plot; as opposed to funding
the travel of recruits to Somalia to be under the command of AS leaders there, this
network sought to plan its own offensive and execute it domestically [101].
However, an investigation of the group reveals that its initial intentions were in
fact very similar to those of the MRN. In late 2008, Walid Osman Mohamed
(WOM) left Australia for Somalia to fight for AS (Fig. 2).
Wissam Mahmoud Fattal (WMF) accompanied WOM with the same intent, but
lacked a proper visa for the first leg of the voyage to Kenya [102]. The plan for the
domestic attack was concocted only once WMF had determined that securing the
appropriate visa would take too long [102]. Furthermore, Yacqub Khayre (YK)
travelled to Somalia to train with AS from April until shortly before his arrest in
August 2009 [103]. Why he returned is not known, but it does not appear that this
training was for use back in Australia. The network includes conspirators who
never attempted to travel to Somalia, but it is unclear whether these individuals
were oriented towards a domestic attack prior to WMF’s inability to travel to
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Somalia. Saney Edow Aweys (SEA) supported WOM before and after his travel to
Somalia, and he was also the main conduit among a trio of AS-affiliated sheikhs
(SA, SH, and SI) situated in Somalia [102]. However, it was unclear how he came
into contact with the sheikhs, and their first documented interaction took place in
February 2009, two months after WMFs aborted departure from Australia [102].
Interaction with AS authorities in Somalia is documented in the two fundraising
networks, but not in the MRN. Interaction between the Somali and Western net-
works is mediated by a broker, a single node situated in the Western network
which receives and discriminately discloses information from Somalia to other
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Western nodes. While Naser el-Sayed (NES) at one time joined SEA in a con-
ference call to SH in June 2009, NES never spoke to the sheikhs alone; SEA was
responsible for all other interaction with the sheikhs and thus is clearly a broker for
the ARN receiving instructions and advice from authorities within the central AS
network [102]. Had the ARN followed the advice of the sheikhs, the function of
the group would have remained limited to sending able men to Somalia to fight.
After months of deliberation and hesitation, SA, SH, and SI decided to deny the
ARN the fatwa they had repeatedly requested for the attack on the Holsworthy
Barracks [102]. The plot targeting the Barracks was not far along when Australian
authorities intervened; the most substantial action had been WMF’S trip from
Melbourne to Sydney to perform some naively superficial surveillance on the
Barrack’s exterior walls [102]. This attack was actively discouraged by the central
AS network as an alternative to travelling to Somalia, which was deemed too
costly. Notwithstanding the network’s domestic plot, it is comparable to the MRN.
The overall failure of the ARN to facilitate travel of potential AS combatants to
Somalia aside, the network is similar to the MRN in key respects. While the MRN
has many more nodes than the ARN, the Western portions of both are unequivocally
all-channel networks, in contrast to the fundraising networks’ distinct hub patterns.
All six of the Australian nodes have documented connections to at least two other
domestic nodes, and four of the six have connections to at least three. While some
connections between nodes are stronger than others; for example, it was noted in
court that WMF and SEA had less contact with each other than their co-accused,
NES, had with either of them [102]. It also seems that the all-channel structure of this
network was reinforced by documented regular interaction between nodes outside of
their illicit activities in a more substantial manner than observed in the MRN. Not
only did media reports claim that several of the six men attended Preston Mosque in
Melbourne together, but NES, WMF and YK worked together as bricklayers
beginning early in 2009 until their arrest in August of that year [102, 104].15
In addition, funds were sent to Somalia (by SEA to WOM) to help fund
combatants who had travelled there after joining the domestic network [102]. This
differs from the two fundraising networks insofar as money was raised and sent to
Somalia to aid AS’ general cause as determined by authorities there, and not by
nodes within the Western network. Furthermore, the MRN and the domestic nodes
of the ARN are geographically concentrated, unlike those of the fundraising net-
works. Just as the MRN is concentrated in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota,
all of the ARN’s domestic nodes lived in Melbourne and surrounding suburbs.
15 While accompanying one another to the Preston Mosque is worth noting, reports of this
behaviour were not specific enough to confirm interactions between specific nodes in this regard.
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6.3 Toronto Recruitment Network
A group consisting mostly of young men16 in Canada also have links to AS, and
while information about them is too scant to render a network map, what little data
is available suggests an all-channel network focused on sending young men to
fight in Somalia. Like the MRN and ARN, the individuals who make up this group
are quite geographically concentrated; besides all residing in Toronto, the majority
lived in the Rexdale/Dixon Park area of Toronto, a region known for its high
concentration of Somali-Canadians [105, 107, 108]. Among these are six young
men who left for Somalia in October 2009. At least two have since been killed
while fighting for AS, one as recently as April 2013 [109, 110]. For reasons
aforementioned, information on these individuals and their interactions are scarce.
The only locus at which all of these nodes intersect is the Abu Huraira Centre in
Rexdale, which three of the six had begun attending before their departure, and
where they were described as ‘‘occasional’’ congregants [107].
While there is no indication that authorities at the mosque facilitated or con-
doned these activities, the mosque presents a social atmosphere where interactions
away from religious leaders are common and vital to the community. Similarly, all
six Australian members of the ARN attended Preston Mosque in Melbourne, and
many MRN members attended Abubakar As-Saddique in Minneapolis. In all three
cases, no mosque leaders have been connected to these networks, and information
about whatever interactions may have occurred is too vague to draw precise, node-
to-node links. Mohamed Hersi, who also worshipped at Abu Huraira, was arrested
as he attempted to leave Canada for Somalia in March 2011, about a year and a
half after the initial group of six [108]. It is (currently) unknown if he is connected
to this group, but he is also the only person to have been arrested in Canada in
connection to AS. Ergo, information from his trial will likely be crucial to
understanding more about any networking activity amongst the Toronto recruits,
and whether he is actually linked to the others.
6.4 Minneapolis Fundraising Network
At about the same time as the MRN, three individuals in Minneapolis and one in
Columbus, Ohio conspired to provide financial support to AS. However, they did
16 Most in this group are young men, with the notable outlier Abdulli Ali Afrah a.k.a. ‘‘Aspro’’,
who rose through AS’ ranks during its first few years to be killed in a mortar attack in early 2008
at age 56. Furthermore, two young Somali-Canadian women from Toronto have also
mysteriously left for Somalia and are rumoured to be there aiding AS. One of these women is
Asli Nur, the 19-year-old niece of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, former Prime Minister of
Somalia. None of these individuals have been connected to the Abu Huraira Islamic Center or to
the other recruits in any other known way, and so these cases may be lone wolves unconnected to
a potential network likely based around Abu Huraira [105, 106].
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not also conspire to leave the U.S. for Somalia. Their activities focused solely on
fundraising and transferring funds to established contacts in Somalia for the
purpose of furthering unspecified AS objectives. This network appears to consist of
two hub networks, situated in Somalia and the U.S., respectively.
Beginning in September 2008, Amina Farah Ali (AFA) of Minneapolis was
confirmed to have been in contact with an AS militant in Somalia, described in court
documents as ‘‘UC1’’, a financial representative for the organization who was
promoted to an administrative governor of several AS-controlled regions in Feb-
ruary 2009 [52, pp. 2–3]. Court documents identify four other contacts in Somalia
who were subordinates of UC1 and who do not appear to have interacted with one
another, three of whom oversaw accounts to which AFA transferred funds [52,
pp. 2–3]. The account numbers corresponding to these individuals were supplied to
AFA by UC1 with whom AFA was in contact repeatedly between September 2008
and July 2009 [52, pp. 6–8]. Court documents have AFA corresponding directly with
two of these subordinates, interacting with one only once in May 2009, and con-
tacting the other in October 2008 to arrange for him to be a guest speaker at a
fundraising teleconference that same month [52, pp. 6–8] (Fig. 3).
In America, AFA was in contact with three individuals, one of whom assisted
with bookkeeping and recording pledges, while the other two collected funds from
donors and directed them to AFA for transfer to Somalia. One of these actors was
explicitly instructed by AFA to collect funds under false pretense, while she tasked
the other with collecting pledges made during one of the teleconferences [52,
pp. 2–3].17 The available information suggests that these three nodes never
interacted. Unlike the MRN, there are no detectable ambiguities to suggest further
links. Notwithstanding the geographic overlap between the MRN and some of the
nodes of the MFN, an exhaustive search revealed no apparent connections between
these networks. The conclusion to be drawn is that the MFN appears to be com-
posed of two hub networks with AFA as the broker between the Minneapolitan and
Somali hubs. While the individuals in Somalia may have other unknown functions
in the larger AS network there, the conspirators in America appear to be concerned
exclusively with supplying funds to be used at the discretion of AS operatives in
Somalia.
17 Of this network, only Ali and the book-keeper (Hawo Mohamed Hassan) were indicted on
charges by the United States government. Information about un-indicted co-conspirators was
crucial to justifying these indictments and is important here (and in the third network, to be
discussed shortly) in accurately portraying the nature of this network’s activities and the structure
of the network necessary for these activities. Information on non-indicted individuals in the
Minneapolis recruitment network is not included because no such individuals can be credibly
implicated in any of the network’s illicit activities, despite numerous calls from the community
alleging complicity of the religious leadership of the Abu-Bakar As-Saddique mosque in
Minneapolis.
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6.4.1 St. Louis/San Diego Fundraising Network
Akin to the MFN, the SL/SD FN, active between January 2008 and March 2009,
was concerned exclusively with raising funds and transferring them to contacts in
Somalia for use there, including the purchase of a vehicle to transport AS militants
[111, pp. 10–12]. Akin to the MFN, the function of the SL/SD FN relied on
repeated contact with AS operatives in Somalia, which were more demanding than
those in the MFN: they requested specific amounts of money for particular pur-
poses. While court documents are unclear on how these funds were raised, the
manner in which these funds were transferred to Somalia is indicative of a network
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similar in structure to the MFN. The main actor in this network was Mohamud
Abdi Yusuf (MAY) of St. Louis, MO. From January to July 2008, he was
repeatedly in contact with Basaaly Saeed Moalin (BM), based in San Diego,
California. In February 2008 BM communicated with Aryow (A), then the leader
of AS, and BM received funds with instructions from MAY to transfer them to
‘‘Omar Mataan’’ (OM) based in Somalia [111, pp. 4, 9, 12–13]. Yusuf himself sent
five installments to Duane Mohamed Diriye (DMD) in Somalia, and interacted
with ‘‘Sheeik Saaid’’ (SS),18 a contact in Somalia introduced to him by DMD [111,
pp. 8–10]. MAY also had multiple conversations with an unknown acquaintance in
Somalia with whom he discussed skirmishes between AS and Ethiopian forces [98,
pp. 12–13].
Court documents unsealed in early 2013 show that the development of the SD/
SL FN is more complex than information available at the time of the pilot study
indicated. It now seems that BM acted as a broker among three men collecting
funds for al-Shabaab in and around San Diego and Ayrow, who was purported to
be a top leader within AS until he was assassinated on May 1, 2008 [112, p. 14].
Independent of MAY or the other nodes in St. Louis, BM co-ordinated a number of
hawala transfers totalling several thousand dollars in the first several months of
2009 [112, pp. 8–14]. While BM was crucially aided by one of the network nodes
(ID), who worked at a San Diego hawala service and assisted both BM and MM in
transferring funds to A in Somalia, all information concerning these transfers (e.g.
the aliases the funds were transferred under, when they were sent and how much
they total) passed through BM [112, p. 13].
Not only did BM broker information in a manner observed in the MFN and the
network BM and his co-conspirators would link up with after A’s death, but this
network also exhibits a hub pattern, with little interaction among the three fun-
draisers that depended on BM for information. Only a single phone call between
ID and MM is documented, and it concerns a hawala transfer requested by A and
co-ordinated by BM [112, p. 12]. Thus, this network exhibits the structure and
dynamic posited earlier as characteristic of fundraising networks, qualities these
nodes maintain after Ayrow’s death.
Despite BM’s apparent autonomy in communicating with Ayrow and co-
ordinating transfers of funds to Somalia, he had been in contact with MAY in St.
Louis about sending funds to AS prior to Ayrow’s death, as early as January 2009
[111, p. 9]. After A’s death, BM was given money by MAY to transfer to one of
MAY’s contacts in Somalia [111, pp. 12–13]. This activity relied on MAY’s
brokerage of information, whereas BM’s role was simply to act on MAY’s
instructions. MAY became the broker of the network because of his resilient
contacts in Somalia, where BM relinquished his status as broker due to A’s death.
Interestingly, BM remained a broker between his associates in San Diego and the
18 This name as well as ‘‘Omar Mataan’’ are always in quotations in court documents, leading to
the suspicion that they are known to be code names by American authorities. This further
obscures the nature of relations between the nodes situated in Somalia, which are unknown
except for the link between Diriye and ‘‘Sheeik Saaid’’.
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hub centered around MAY in San Diego. MAY only spoke with nodes in San
Diego other than BM on one occasion, a conference call between MAY, BM, ID
and MM in July 2008 [112, p. 16]. Otherwise, MAY and BM were the centers of
their respective hubs, each being the primary contact for the other. Who served as
a broker between fundraising efforts in the West and AS leaders in Somalia
appears to be largely determined by the strength of pre-existing ties to these
authorities. However, there is no information on how these initial contacts were
formed, or how BM in San Diego came to associate with MAY in St. Louis [112,
p. 14] (Figs. 4 and 5).19
From May 2008 until March 2009, Yusuf was also linked to Abdi Mahdi
Hussein (AMH), an employee of Qaran Financial Express, LLC, a hawala
remittance firm with a branch in Minneapolis. AMH agreed to make 14 remit-
tances to an unknown contact in Somalia in a manner that obscured the identities
of the sender and the receiver, and in amounts small enough to avoid requiring the
sender to provide and verify their identity. However, court documents and the
criminal charge against AMH indicate that he was unaware of any connection to
AS [111, pp. 20–23]. MAY interacted with four other individuals about various
aspects involved in sending money oversees to support AS, and AMH met one of
them once in May 2008 [111, p. 21]. This is the only direct link between indi-
viduals in America with whom Yusuf discussed his illicit activities.
The activities of the SL/SD FN were coordinated by nodes broken down into
hubs. MAY is the most active node on the American side, connected to five other
nodes of which only two had contact on a single occasion. One of these contacts,
BM, was also at the center of a hub with six individuals aside from MAY, also
with no documented connections except through BM. As in the other fundraising
network, no node expressed any desire to travel to Somalia. Connections between
America and Somalia other than through MAY are inconsequential; BM had a
Fig. 4 St. Louis/San Diego
fundraising network—before
Ayrow’s death
19 While a contact of BM’s identified as ‘‘Kay’’ did successfully refer BM to Mahad Karate, an
AS member in Somalia, no money was ever remitted to him from the Western nodes.
Why Terror Networks are Dissimilar: How Structure Relates to Function 109
Figure 4-5 Legend 
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Fig. 5 San Diego/St. Louis fundraising network—After Ayrow’s Death
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single conversation with a high-ranking AS official and sent funds to Somalia, but
the quantity and destination of these funds were determined by MAY with some
instruction from his two contacts in Somalia. Of the nodes in Somalia, DMD was
the most important; while SS seems to exert influence over the quantity, timing,
and use of the Somalia-bound funds, MAY was introduced to SS through DMD.
The SL/SD FN matches Morselli’s predictions for small networks. The indi-
viduals connected to MAY and DMD who were situated in America exhibit a low
degree centrality and almost non-existent betweenness centrality. Here, brokers
play a slightly less crucial role than observed in the MFN because there are
multiple links across which funds and information flowed between America and
Somalia within this network. However, one pair of brokers, MAY in America and
DMD in Somalia, appears to be pivotal to the network’s function. While both
Hussein and BM sent money to Somalia, and BM had a relatively high
betweenness centrality due to his links to MAY as well as A and in Somalia, MAY
received and controlled the flow of information from the AS operative in Somalia
and controlled the timing and quantity of funds remitted after A’s death. Like the
Minneapolis network, the removal of the link between MAY and DMD and/or SS
(a link forged due to MAY’s prior link with DMD) compromised the functionality
of the network.
7 Findings and Discussion
The addition of the ARN and the TRN to the initial pilot application of SNA
largely confirm the initial hypotheses. The two most striking differences between
the MRN and the ARN are the presence of brokers as well as intent to commit a
domestic attack. These will be addressed in turn.
In both cases, fundraising networks required a pair of brokers—one in Somalia
and one in the U.S. respectively—to facilitate a flow of information that in turn
allowed for the remittance of funds to Somalia. As the brokers are essential to the
function of these networks (as evidenced by the changes to the SD/SLFN fol-
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at the center of that network), fundraising networks are thought to depend on the
actions of brokers. The ARN did not rely on brokers in this sense, as they did not
rely on (or even follow) information and advice given to them by SA, SH, and SI.
Had this advice been heeded, this network’s actors would have oriented their
efforts towards recruitment. However, individuals joined the group and departed
for Somalia before any documented contact with SA, SH, and SI; so, they did not
rely on brokers for this function either. The ARN (and perhaps recruiting networks
in general) may contain nodes that act as brokers, but nowhere are they seen to rely
on these brokers to maintain their network or achieve their objectives.
The presence of a domestic plot may strike more deeply at the initial hypoth-
eses, because it seems to indicate that networks need not be specialized at all; this
network exhibits the two distinct functions of recruitment (for foreign training and
combat) and planning a domestic attack. However, this discrepancy is mitigated by
other available information. As discussed above, the function of recruitment began
chronologically prior to a domestic plot being hatched, and the failure to travel
abroad is confirmed to have encouraged the idea of an attack within Australia. This
presents a counter-intuitive case insofar as security measures (in this case, the
particular agreement between Australia and Kenya as to what documentation is
required to travel between the two states) actually encouraged an attack on
Western soil rather than preventing it. However, it also serves to demonstrate that
the recruiting function was the primary aim of this group, and that it fits the scope
conditions of a recruitment network. It is possible that terrorist networks aiming to
perpetrate a domestic terrorist attack will also organize into an all-channel net-
work, but as of yet there is no known network that fits the parameters of this study;
so, further analysis is not yet possible.
Table 3 distinguishes attributes of fundraising and recruitment networks and
compares these traits to the ARN:
The ARN deviates somewhat from the structure and dynamic of a recruitment
network as posited by the pilot study. While these deviations, for reasons discussed
above, do not fundamentally challenge the hypotheses, they introduce certain
nuances into the discussion.
H1 Terrorist networks are functionally differentiated
H2 The structure and characteristics of terrorist networks is a function of their
purpose
These hypotheses are confirmed by the ARN, and potentially hold true for the
TRN. These networks were focused on recruiting and sending individuals to fight
in Somalia until the travel plans of a high inter-connected node were frustrated.
The ARN exhibited an all-channel structure reminiscent of the MRN, and distinct
from the two fundraising networks. The TRN appears to have a similar structure.
H3 Recruitment-oriented networks rely on domestic all-channel networks that
are geographically concentrated (that is, for the purpose of recruitment,
proximity matters)
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H4 Fund-raising networks rely on transcontinental hub networks (that is,
proximity does not seem an impediment)
H5 Control over access to recruitment networks is informal and decentralized
The TRN appears to be confined to a single city, much like the MRN. Much of
the ARN was concentrated in the city of Melbourne, but also contained three nodes
who resided in Somalia during the ARN’s operation. Although the ARN contained
international linkages, it did not rely on these linkages for recruitment activities or
the preparation for a domestic attack that followed. The contention that ‘‘for the
purpose of recruitment, proximity matters’’ still obtains, as neither the presence
nor the activities of SA, SH, and SI in Somalia affected recruitment activities. The
importance of geographical proximity to different types of terrorist activity makes
this hypothesis particularly useful to the study of illicit networks, and the inter-
action between SA, SH, and SI with the Australian nodes of the ARN ought not
detract from this finding.
The additional information on BM and the fundraising network he brokered
prior to his involvement with MAY shows that fundraising networks adopt a hub
pattern even on very small scales. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that
anyone from any of the networks under investigation controlled or even made an
attempt to control the membership of the ARN; admittance to both fundraising and
recruitment networks appears informal and decentralized across all cases.
Table 3 Asssessment of fundraising and recruitment characteristics by type of network, with
comparison to ARN
Network Type Fundraising Recruitment Australian
Recruitment Networka



























Use of funds Remittances: American








a Due to that aforementioned limits on what can be known about the TRN, only the ARN is
compared in this table. The TRN will be discussed along with the ARN in the ensuing comments
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H6 Fundraising networks rely heavily on the actions of ‘brokers’;
H7 Recruitment networks do not rely on brokers
Like the MRN, the TRN currently appears devoid of brokers. The claim that
recruitment networks do not contain brokers whatsoever cannot be made in light of
the ARN, but useful claims can still be consistently made as to the function of
brokers within different types of networks. The ARN did not rely on brokers, but
instead contained a node (SEA) who had substantially more contact than any other
node with SA, SH, and SI. Ergo, SEA may have been in a position to broker the
flow of information between the network’s Somali and Australian nodes, but this
information appears to have been inconsequential to the ARN’s tactics, especially
since they disregarded the sheikhs’ advice regarding the proposed domestic attack.
As before, funding networks rely heavily on brokers to coordinate international
transfers of funds. Juxtaposing the activities of brokers in the fundraising networks
with those in the ARN shows that the latter’s brokers are irrelevant.
H8 Transfer of funds from the central network to peripheral networks is not
necessarily indicative of the pursuit of terrorist ends
This final hypothesis is strengthened by the ARN. Not only did the central
network (SA, SH, SI) not send money or other resources to the peripheral network,
but they discouraged the domestic attack and advised the group to specialize solely
in recruitment. At least in the case of AS, the dynamics of support between the
centre and the periphery run counter to prevailing assumptions about hierarchical,
top-down flows of funds and personnel. Conversely, the central AS network relies
on networks situated within Western states for infusions of cash and manpower.
While the successful transfer of funds requires coordination between the peripheral
and central networks, recruitment networks appear to function rather indepen-
dently, recruiting individuals and funding their travel without advice or expecta-
tions from the central network.20
8 Conclusion
In a large-scale study of terrorist groups, Piazza divides them into two broads
categories based upon the nature of their ultimate objectives and the means used to
achieve them. These types are ‘‘universalist/abstract’’ and ‘‘strategic’’. The former
is characterized by esoteric goals that are often broad in scale, and by contrast the
latter by goals which can be empirically measured and are often more directly
20 This should not indicate that members of the recruitment networks were not exposed to
propaganda available on the Internet that has been produced by AS operatives in Somalia such as
Omar Hammami. However, this is obviously distinct from communicating with the central
network to co-ordinate the activities of the peripheral network.
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achievable because of these concrete goals and a typically smaller scope [113,
p. 65]. In turn, the former attempts to achieve these goals mostly through acts
designed to draw broad attention and unite some under an ideology while de-
monizing others, while the latter achieves their objectives through more localized,
tactical activities [113, p. 65].
AS is a critical case precisely because it straddles these two categories: not only
is AS intent on establishing an Islamic caliphate in Somalia by raising an inter-
national militia and combating states’ armies, but it also engages in high-profile
kidnappings of Westerners and sporadically refers to global jihad [114, 115, 2,
pp. 203–204]. It is difficult to think of another terrorist group with the combination
of substantial activity among multiple separate networks and reliable documen-
tation of these interactions and activities with the presence of both a central
network and subsidiary networks in the West that is hypothesized and fantasized
about by much of the current literature on terrorism and many Western politicians.
On the one hand, the sample in this study may be small, thus limiting the
inferences that can be drawn from the findings and their generalizability. On the
other hand, the evidence on which the study draws is relatively robust. To compare
networks across the same time and space makes it possible to control for simi-
larities and differences in ways that would otherwise be more difficult methodo-
logically if context and conditions were held less constant. The initial hypotheses
need further empirical scrutiny and validation, both through comparison to other
AS networks and through comparison to other terror networks about which reliable
information is available, so that brokers can be identified where they exist, link-
ages confirmed, and an accurate model of the entire network and its relations to a
central organization constructed. The fact that the great majority of the nodes in
these networks are Somalis living in Western diasporas raises the importance of
diasporas and ethnic capital as means of decreasing marginal and transaction costs
as an issue that also warrants further study. Ethnic identity compounded by radical
Islamist/jihadist ideology certainly had a hand in congealing these networks.
The findings of this study of all known Western networks connected to AS
challenges some of the conventional wisdom surrounding the structure and
function of terrorist networks, especially those in the West. Most importantly, this
study finds that such networks have specialized functions, and that the structure of
such networks seems to correlate with these functions. These different functions
determine the nature of their relationship with the central organization. This has
implications for law enforcement and counter-terrorism.
First, information about the function of a network, even when many of its nodes
and linkages remain obscure, can be indicative of its structure and, therefore, how
best to intercept it. For example, knowledge that the network is oriented towards
raising and remitting funds would warrant the search for a ‘broker’ node whose
disruption would debilitate the function of the network, at least temporarily. By
contrast, networks specializing in recruitment appear to be more robust and
resilient to the removal of even multiple nodes. As Bakker et al. confirm, much
work remains to be done on how networks replace nodes, re-establish links or re-
route flows of information and/or resources through other nodes; so, it is difficult to
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predict how effective the removal of nodes would be over time [57, pp. 56–57].
However, the possibility that a network’s function and structure are related is a
promising step towards a more nuanced strategy to contain and deter such net-
works: not all terror networks are alike. This is a significant empirical finding for
counter-terrorism. Knowing the function of a network makes it possible to counter
it by detecting and debilitating its nodes. Conversely, knowing the structure of a
network makes it possible to surmise its purpose.
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